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The idea that the financial structure of firms together with the
characteristics of their access to credit could be a major source of
economic fluctuations dates back to the time of the Great Depression.
Irving Fisher was one of the first contemporary scholars who tried to
relate price deflations to reallocations of wealth from debtors to
creditors leading to a fall in the overall demand. His work emphasized
the high increase in the real burden of borrowers debt in the expansion
preceding 1929: “The depression out of which we are now (I trust)
emerging is an example of a debt-deflation depression of the most
serious sort. The debts of 1929 were the greatest known, both nominally
and really, up to that time”1. Although these intuitions received less and
less attention in the next generations of macroeconomic reflections,
given the emphasis on the Keynesian-Monetarist controversies,there has
been in the last decades a great resurgence of interest for the thesis that a
deeper understanding of the nature of capital market imperfections may
be significantly helpful in characterizing economic cycles.
Several approaches have been undertaken to support the celebrated
Gurley and Shaw (1955) conviction that the way in which entrepreneurs
decide to finance their production activities and interact with financial
institutions is to be conceived as the main source of economic
fluctuations. Despite their articulated and heterogeneous findings, the
approaches share in common the reference to the intertemporal
equilibrium methodology and the search for rigorous microfoundations.
Their main aim has been clearly stated by Gertler: “Modifying the
Brock-Mirman framework - which would eventually become the core
for Real Business Cycle theory - to consider financial issues was a
formidable task (and remains so today). Modeling imperfections in
intertemporal trade obviously requires having an environment where
there exists motivation for trade; this necessitates to introduce
heterogeneity among agents [...]. The representative agent formulation
used in competitive growth models - and subsequently in Real Business
Cycle theory - effectively abstracts from trade”2.
Generally speaking, we may say that these studies mainly followed the
most standard approach in business cycle theories. This corresponds to
represent an intrinsically stable economic system which dynamics might
become erratic and cyclical because of the impact of exogenous
stochastic shocks. These shocks, either monetary or real, may crucially
alter firms balance sheets, limiting in this way their access to financial
1Fisher, (1933) p. 345.
2Gertler, (1988) p. 11.
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markets. This is the reference framework of very influential works like
Bernanke and Gertler (1988) and Kyiotaki and Moore (1997).
A somehow less popular research direction analyzed deterministic
economies where the presence of asymmetric information in financial
markets is responsible for the existence of endogenous business
fluctuations. In such a perspective, the imperfect working of financial
markets is an intrinsic source of instability that prevents economic
dynamics from gravitating around its stationary position. In a series of
contributions of the late 80s Micheal Woodford, among many others,
argued that the explicit consideration of loan market imperfections could
alleviate the lack of empirical relevance of the situations where
competitive economies do exhibit endogenous fluctuations3. In the most
recent years, a deeper representation of loan relationships, that is, an
analysis of the allocations implemented by financial contracts under
asymmetric information in credit markets, has been conceived as a
natural reinforcement of this approach. One of the most important works
in this direction has been provided by Suarez and Sussman (1997).
Given a lender-borrower relationship subject to moral hazard, liquidity
effects turn out to be the source of endogenous fluctuations in an
economy where financing takes place through both external debt and
internal revenues. Since firms’ effort to subscribe good projects is a
decreasing function of the amount of external financing, cycles may
arise because of the dependence of internal liquidity on prices. During
booms external financing will be more and more required, with the main
consequence of amplifying moral hazard effects. This will prepare
recessions.
The effort of integrating incentive problems in the study of economic
fluctuations is anyway very recent. My research makes a step forward in
such a direction suggesting the existence of a relationship between
business cycle fluctuations and modifications in the structure of loan
relationships. The aim is to provide a potential departure from the
traditional corporate finance theories in showing that the characteristics
of firms’ capital structure (i.e. their debt-equity ratio) can be affected by
macroeconomic conditions. I build on Suarez and Sussman by properly
modelling a two-period financial contracting problem. The features of
optimal securities issued at equilibrium are influenced by
macroeconomic conditions, i.e. by equilibrium prices. In other words,
asymmetric information in the market for loans is still responsible for
endogenous fluctuations to take place at equilibrium, but we further
3The traditional explanations for the existence of equilibrium endogenous fluctuations were mainly concerned
with the limits to intertemporal arbitrage due to agents impatience, short life-span horizons, strong income effects.
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argue that business fluctuations affect the nature of firms’ financing over
time. As a by-product, the debt-equity ratio in the overall economy will
vary according to the dynamics of aggregate variables. This argument
contrasts pecking-order based theories of financing (Myers, 1984) that
explain the composition of firms’ external financing by looking at the
agency costs faced by entrepreneurs-borrowers under asymmetric
information. The idea that macroeconomic conditions are an important
component of the debt-equity choice is receiving an increasing support,
both in applied and theoretical studies (see Levy, 2001, for a survey). I
consider a competitive economy populated by an infinite sequence of
overlapping generations of borrowers-firms who live for three periods
and produce only in the last two periods of their life. Borrowers hold a
stochastic production technology but they do not have the resources to
carry out their investment projects. The amount of external financing
issued is determined by a financial contract signed by every generation
of borrowers with a representative consumer-lender. If an optimal
dynamic contract exists, then at equilibrium young firms will issue
repayments that resemble equity, while old firms will have an incentive
to finance through debt arrangements. These alternative securities will
coexist in every period: the presence of a dynamic contracting issue is
responsible for such a co-existence, while the emergence of standard
debt as an optimal arrangement comes from the introduction of a CSV
problem. The main feature of our economy turns out to be the
interaction between the dynamic contracting problem and the existence
of finitely-lived firms. Such an interaction is the key to understand the
role of liquidity and the potential alternance between debt and equity
financing in our economy.
The next step of the thesis develops a more radical departure from the
standard characterization of cycles: we try to contribute to a view that
puts financial constraints are at the root of out-of-equilibrium
fluctuations arising from the incapability of the price system to
coordinate the economy towards Pareto optima Walrasian equilibria.
This way of thinking is closer in several respects to the first generation
of non-linear endogenous fluctuations schemes as they were developed
by Hicks, Kaldor and Goodwin. That is, it departs from the assumption
that business fluctuations should be analyzed as an equilibrium
phenomenon, thereby denying the traditional perspective that assesses
them as a form of coordination failure. This conviction is actually
shared by the Real Business Cycle as well as the recent endogenous
cycle theories: “To a modern business cycle economist, the economy
remains in continuous equilibrium along the adjustment path towards
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the steady-growth time path. Any trajectory is called intertemporal
equilibrium. On the contrary, earlier economists (and, for that matter,
temporary equilibrium theorists as well) would have reserved the
intertemporal equilibrium term for the single time path acting as an
attractor for the other trajectories” (De Vroey, 2002, p.18). In other
words, the domain of equilibrium analysis and welfare theorems has
been extended to economies exhibiting persisting oscillations in output,
employment, capital accumulation. The approach developed here
represents fluctuations as an irreversible phenomenon arising in
economies with a persistent lack of coordination over time: the role of
credit becomes then crucial in guaranteeing that the economy could
remain viable. The distinguishing feature of the approach is the
development of a logical structure that allows for disequilibria to
transmit from one period to the others, given the focus on a
time-articulated representation of production. As a consequence, our
work tries to investigate how the interaction between these variables
may be at the root of the distribution of financial resources between
construction and utilization of productive capacity.
The the thesis is organized in three chapters. The first one presents the
basic schemes of endogenous fluctuations with imperfect financial
markets and discusses the implications of asymmetric information in
lender-borrower relationships on firms’ financing decisions. Emphasis
has been given to the recent literature that defines financial arrangements
as the equilibria of a mechanism design problem. The chapter aims at
showing how the standard view adopted by macroeconomic models with
imperfect financial markets is to consider the form of relevant financial
security (debt, equity) as given. In other words, the design of an optimal
incentive scheme under asymmetric information and the aggregate
consequences of imperfect financial markets have up to now been
treated as separated issues. The second chapter, “Financial contracting
along the business cycle”, provides the original contribution mentioned
before. Finally, the third chapter, “Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian
economy”, studies the role of financial constraints in a sequential
economy. We build on the Amendola and Gaffard (1998)
out-of-equilibrium scheme in modeling a form of external financing in
the construction of new productive capacity. An important issue we
tackled is to check whether the working of a market for loans, absent in
the Amendola and Gaffard construction, might sustain the viability of
the economy. In other words, we try to clarify the conditions ensuring
that existence of external finance favors the balancement between
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constructing new productive capacity and sustaining the existing one
along an off-equilibrium economic evolution.
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